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Measuring and Explaining Government Inefficiency in 
Developing Countries 
 
Nicolas Van de Sijpe




We show the relevance of government expenditure inefficiency using the Barro (1990) model. We 
estimate government inefficiency for 52 developing countries using a data envelopment analysis. The 
estimated inefficiencies are subsequently used in a general to specific approach in order to identify 
their determinants. We find the government expenditure inefficiency is primarily determined by 
governance and political variables, and structural country variables. Economic policy determinants 
apparently count less. Government inefficiency of the Sub Saharan countries in the sample is 
substantially higher. 
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Growth models during the past decades have articulated a “deep-seeded belief that taxation, public 
investment, and other aspects of fiscal policy can contribute to growth miracles as well as to enduring 
stagnation” (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993, p. 418). In one of the seminal contributions to endogenous 
growth theory, Robert Barro (1990) awarded fiscal policy a central place. Other authors (e.g. Lucas, 
1988, Romer, 1986 and 1990, Azariadis and Drazen, 1990) have stressed the importance of 
externalities to argue the government has an important role to fulfill in the growth process. In a generic 
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model, Zagler and Dürnecker (2003) have shown that the various engines of growth in the endogenous 
growth literature are closely connected with different categories of the government budget. 
 
If endogenous growth theory has confirmed the expectation of many economists that budgetary policy 
can be of crucial importance for long-run growth, empirical research has done quite the opposite. For 
instance, while Easterly and Rebelo (1993) find public investment in transport and communication to 
be positively related to growth, Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou (1996) report insignificant or even 
negative growth-effects for transportation and communication expenditure. In addition, neither paper 
uncovers a significant relation between other types of productive expenditure (health, education,…) 
and growth. In reviewing the existing empirical literature Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1998) report 
widespread non-robustness of coefficient sign and significance for fiscal variables. In the sensitivity 
analyses of Levine and Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1997a and 1997b) not one fiscal indicator is 
classified as robust. 
 
One compelling reason for the failure of empirical research to find support for the Barro (1990) model 
is given by Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) and Bleaney, Gemmell and Kneller (2001). These 
authors show that incompletely specifying the government budget constraint leads to an estimation 
bias. For example, failure to account for distortionary taxation
1 causes a downward bias in the 
productive expenditure coefficient. What the estimated coefficient then actually measures is the impact 
of a unit increase in productive expenditure, at least partly financed by distortionary taxation. 
According to the theory this effect may be close to zero, which could explain the lack of an empirical 
relationship between productive public spending and growth. Both papers correct this bias and 
conclude, for a sample of OECD countries, that productive expenditure (including among others 
expenditure on education, health, and transport and communication) does stimulate growth, lending 
strong empirical support to the Barro (1990) model. 
 
Other variables may count as well to explain the disappointing empirical results discussed earlier. In 
fact, for developing countries it is very likely that government inefficiency plays a more prominent 
role than distortionary taxation. We see essentially two reasons for this claim.  First, in the 1990s, aid 
represented on average 33.43% of central government expenditure in the 118 low and lower middle 
income countries (economies with 2001 GNI per capita lower than $2,975) for which data are 
available (World Development Indicators, 2003). In addition, most developing countries rely on the 
                                                      
1 This is taxation that influences the investment decisions of agents, with respect to human and/or physical 
capital (Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell, 1999, p. 173). Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) classify taxation 
on income and profit, social security contributions, taxation on payroll and manpower, and taxation on property 
as distortionary.   4
taxation of domestic goods and services and the taxation of imports and exports for a substantial part 
of their revenues. None of these taxes profoundly distort investment decisions
2. Distortionary taxes, 




The second reason for emphasizing inefficiency is the frequency and magnitude with which it occurs. 
Pritchett and Filmer (1997) report systematic misallocation of education spending, for the most part 
due to the strong influence teachers have on resource allocations. The World Development Report 
2004 (World Bank, 2003) offers numerous examples of public facilities (schools, health clinics, 
transportation,…) with severely limited access for poor people. Ablo and Reinikka (1998) and 
Reinikka and Svensson (2001) reveal that in the first half of the 90s only 13% of central government 
expenditure on education in Uganda actually reached schools. Estimates show 40% to 94% of public 
medicine supplies simply disappeared. Filmer, Hammer and Pritchett (1997) refer to a number of 
studies in other countries that report similar irregularities
4. The quality of services provided is often 
low, resulting in bypassing (people go to private facilities or better equipped public facilities, even if 
this means they have to pay more or travel longer distances) and low utilization of public facilities 
(Filmer, Hammer and Pritchett, 1997). As a result, countries spending more on education or health do 
not necessarily achieve better results in these areas, as evidenced by several cross-country studies 
(Musgrove, 1996, Mingat and Tan, 1998, Filmer and Pritchett, 1999, Rajkumar and Swaroop, 2002, p. 
3-5, World Bank, 2003, p. 37-38)
5. From their estimates Filmer and Pritchett (1999) infer that there are 
vast discrepancies between the actual public spending per child death averted and cost-effectiveness 
estimates of the minimum required cost to avert a death for most childhood conditions. 
                                                      
2 Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) label taxation on international trade as ‘other revenues’ and not as non-
distortionary taxation. However, in the subsequent regression analysis ‘other revenues’ is not significantly 
related to growth. 
3 In making this claim we implicitly assume the negative growth effect of an extra unit of distortionary taxation 
is larger when the level of distortionary taxation in the economy is already high. Otherwise, the bias in the public 
expenditure coefficient when these taxes are ignored would be more or less the same in a developing country 
(with low levels of distortionary taxation) as in a developed country (where distortionary taxes are more 
prominent). 
4 The same authors also provide an illustrative anecdote (Filmer, Hammer and Pritchett, 1997, p. 19). In one low 
income country a newspaper accused the Ministry of Health of misappropriating $50 million of donor financing. 
The ministry was appalled and immediately replied this money was misappropriated over a period of three years 
and not one year, as the article implied. 
5 Gupta, Verhoeven and Tiongson (1999) are an exception. Bidani and Ravallion (1997) only find significant 
effects of public health expenditure on life expectancy and child mortality for poor people, but not for rich 
people.   5
 
In this paper, we measure government expenditure inefficiency in a number of low and lower middle 
income countries and identify its determinants. First, as a theoretical motivation of this study, we 
discuss a variant of the Barro (1990) model of public goods and economic growth in which we 
explicitly consider the role of inefficiency. Though extremely simplified, this model will help to firmly 
establish a theoretical link between inefficiency and growth. At the same time, it illustrates that failure 
to account for inefficiency may be a relevant explanation for the lack of a robust empirical relationship 
between productive public spending and economic growth
6.  This indicates the relevance of measuring 
government inefficiency in developing countries and of searching for the determinants of this 
inefficiency. 
 
A direct measure of government inefficiency or a reasonable proxy is, however, not generally 
available at the country level. A logical solution for this shortcoming is to estimate it instead. In 
section 3 inefficiency scores are estimated for 52 developing countries, using a non-parametric linear 
programming-based technique called Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Section 3 starts with a short 
methodological guide to DEA and also contains a justification as to why DEA is chosen over the 
stochastic frontier (SF) method to measure inefficiency in this specific context. In section 4 estimated 
inefficiency is used as the dependent variable in a general to specific approach of regression analysis, 
allowing us to search for the true determinants of inefficiency. Section 5 concludes and draws 
attention to some policy implications. 
 
 
2  The Importance of Inefficiency for Growth. 
 
In a basic fiscal policy model (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, p. 152-158) it is easy to explicitly 
introduce inefficiency and illustrate how it affects growth. For the ease of the exposition, we omit the 












c u , (1) 
                                                      
6 Due to data problems for developing countries and methodological issues, we refrain from estimating growth 
regressions with inefficiency as one of the regressors. In future research, we will address these issues to 
investigate the empirical influence of inefficiency on growth, and the role of inefficiency in testing the Barro 
(1990) model. 
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with constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution equal to  σ 1.   c  represents per capita 
consumption. Dynamic optimization of household lifetime utility, subject to a dynamic budget 
constraint of the form  c ra w a − + =
•
 in every period  (w is the wage income, r  the interest rate and 
a  stands for wealth, which is assumed to be zero in the initial and last periods:  0 0 = = T a a ), yields 













where  γ , the growth of income per capita, is positively related to the interest rate r  and negatively 
related to the rate of time preference ρ . 
 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, p. 152-158) assume a Cobb-Douglas production function for firm i 
with constant returns in the private inputs labor ( i L ) and physical capital ( i K ): 
 
α α α − − =
1 1 G K AL Y i i i . (3) 
 
Aggregate labor force L is assumed constant. G  represents productive government spending. For 
fixed G  this function exhibits decreasing returns to the accumulation of capital  i K . But when  i K  and 
G  are expanded simultaneously, constant returns arise and endogenous growth becomes possible. 
 
The government balances its budget. All productive expenditure G  is financed by a proportional tax 
at rate τ , levied on gross aggregate output. The tax rate is assumed constant over time: 
 
Y G τ = . (4) 
 
In (4) it is assumed that the total revenue collected is transformed into productive government 
spending. This might be a fairly strong assumption. Let us suppose instead that there is not necessarily 
a one-to-one relationship between productive spending G  and revenue, by introducing an efficiency 
parameter  δ  ( 1 0 ≤ ≤δ ) that determines the transformation of government revenue into productive 
expenditure: 
 
Y R G δτ δ = = . (4’)   7
 
δ  is similar to ‘iceberg’-type transportation costs in international trade models (e.g. Krugman, 1990, 
and Krugman and Venables, 1995). We assume a fraction  δ − 1  of revenues ‘melts away’, i.e. is not 
transformed in productive spending, due to different types of inefficiency: misallocation, low quality 
of public services, waste of resources and the crowding out of private spending (Filmer, Hammer and 
Pritchett, 1997). 
 
Profit maximization in a competitive economy equals the interest rate to the after-tax marginal product 






i ∀ = = , we obtain: 
 
α α α τ τ
− − − − = ∂ ∂ − =
1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) )( 1 ( G Ak K Y r i i . (5) 
 
Substituting (3) in (4’) yields an expression in G  which can be inserted in (5) to solve for the interest 
rate. From (2) the expression for the (decentralized) income per capita growth rate becomes: 
 
[] ρ δ τ τ α σ γ
α α α α α − − =
− − / ) 1 ( / ) 1 ( / 1 ) 1 ( ) ( ) / 1 ( L A . (6) 
 
High inefficiency (a low δ ) harms growth, implying that failure to take inefficiency into account in 
growth regressions can lead to a downward bias in the productive expenditure coefficient, precisely as 
disregarding distortionary taxation (represented in (6) by the factor  ) ( τ − 1 ) does. It is straightforward 
to see that the relationship between government inefficiency and economic growth also holds in the 
case of lump-sum taxes; i.e. when (4) may be written as: 
 
R G δ = , (4’’) 
 
and τ  vanishes from (6). Hence, government inefficiency is complementary to distortionary taxation 
to explain the weak link between productive expenditure and growth. The more inefficient 
governments are, the more the positive influence of productive expenditure is diminished and, 
therefore, the more growth rates are reduced. This also implies insight into the determinants of 
government inefficiency is vital for policy purposes. In the next section government inefficiency is 
estimated, in section 4 we search for its determinants.   8
 




As far as we could verify, a measure or a proxy of government inefficiency does not exist. This 
implies that in order to identify its determinants, we first have to derive an estimate of government 
inefficiency. Here we opt for the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method to estimate inefficiency. 
DEA is a non-parametric linear programming-based technique designed to calculate relative 
efficiency. A Banker, Charnes and Cooper (BCC) model allowing variable returns to scale is 
employed (Banker, Charnes and Cooper, 1984). This is in close accordance with the theoretical fiscal 
policy models, where the positive effects of productive government expenditure weaken as the 
government or the expenditure ratios become bigger (Barro, 1990, Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou, 
1996). 
 
The BCC-model with one input and one output is illustrated in Figure 1. The first step in measuring 
inefficiency entails estimating a production possibility frontier. DEA constructs this efficient frontier 
(the piecewise linear curve IABCDE plus the horizontal line from E) by ‘enveloping’ the data points 
according to a number of assumptions (Banker, Charnes and Cooper, 1984, also see Post, 1999, and 
Thanassoulis, 2001): 
-  Interpolation between observed input-output-combinations results in new, feasible input-
output-combinations. In other words, it is assumed the production possibility set is convex. 
-  Free disposability: for every input-output-combination it is possible to become less efficient 
by reducing output or increasing input. 
-  Inputs and outputs are positive (Bowlin, 1998), a trivial assumption. 
-  The production possibility set is the smallest set that satisfies these assumptions and contains 
all observed input-output-combinations.   9
 



















Source: own figure, based on Thanassoulis, 2001, p. 10 
 
Next, inefficiency is measured as the distance from the constructed production possibility frontier. 
Technical output efficiency
7 indicates to what extent output can be expanded with fixed input. In a 
situation with more than one output, technical output efficiency of a Decision Making Unit (DMU) is 
“the maximum proportion any one of its observed output levels represents of the level that output 
takes when all outputs are expanded radially as far as feasible, without detriment to its input levels” 
(Thanassoulis, 2001, p. 24). A radial expansion is the same as an equiproportional expansion, keeping 
the output mix constant. For DMU K technical output efficiency is measured as HK/HG. This amounts 
to solving the following linear programming problem (Banker, Charnes and Cooper, 1984, also see 
Post, 1999, p. 24 and Thanassoulis, 2001, p. 134): 
 
                                                      
7 Allocative output efficiency concerns the choice of an optimal output mix, taking prices into consideration. 
Since the outputs we are concerned with do not have prices, we focus on technical efficiency. Total efficiency is 
the product of both types of efficiency (Thanassoulis, 2001, p. 27-28).   10
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with  rj y  the r
th output of the  j
th DMU,  ij x  the i
th input of the  j
th DMU,  '
r s  the outputslack for the 
r
th output of DMU k ,  i s  the inputslack for the i
th input of DMU k  and ε  a non-Archimedean 
infinitesimal
8.  k , BCC ˆ θ  represents the inefficiency of DMU k  and has a lower bound of 1, attained in 
the absence of relative inefficiency. Hence, the more efficient a DMU is, the lower the estimated 
inefficiency score.  k , BCC ˆ θ 1  falls between 0 and 1, and therefore corresponds to the verbal and visual 
definitions of efficiency given above. In the empirical estimates, we report the inefficiency scores 
k BCC, ˆ θ . The optimal slacks,  *
i s  and  '*
r s , represent non-radial inefficiencies (Post, 1999, p. 24). 
 
A parametric alternative to DEA is the stochastic frontier method (SF) (Coelli, Rao and Battese, 1998, 
p. 183-219). SF estimates a production function (or cost function) and models the error term in two 
parts: one reflecting traditional statistical noise (usually assumed to be normally distributed) and one 
representing inefficiency (with a one-sided distribution, often half-normal or truncated normal). A 
conceptual advantage of SF is that it deals with random noise, while DEA attributes every deviation 
from the efficient frontier to inefficiency. As a result, DEA is rather sensitive to measurement error. 
On the other hand, SF requires an a priori specification of the functional form for the relationship 
between inputs and outputs, and an explicit distribution for inefficiency. 
 
To compare both methods most authors simulate inefficiency scores by defining an underlying 
technology and assuming a distribution for the random disturbance and inefficiency. SF and DEA   11
estimates are then compared to the true, simulated inefficiency, using a number of metrics (rank 
correlations, mean deviations,…). When DEA is compared to a SF model that is estimated assuming a 
technology and inefficiency distribution closely related to the ones used in the data generating process, 
then two types of possible misspecification are ruled out and it is hardly a surprise that SF outperforms 
DEA (as in Gong and Sickles, 1992). When the technology and the distribution of inefficiency are a 
priori unknown the risk of misspecification becomes larger, making DEA more appealing (Gong and 
Sickles, 1992, also see Banker, Gadh and Gorr, 1993)
9. In a similar study, Read en Thanassoulis 
(1996) introduce a number of unusual input-output-mixes in an otherwise correctly specified 
production function. They conclude SF outperforms DEA, but not so at reasonably low levels of noise, 
where both methods yield comparable results. When inefficiency is introduced in a slightly different 
manner, less advantageous for SF, severe bias is reported for the SF regression approach (Cooper and 
Tone, 1997). Resti (2000) uses a piecewise parametric production function in the data generation 
process to avoid giving parametric techniques an unfair advantage over their non-parametric 
contenders. DEA and SF produce very similar results, both yielding estimates close to true 
inefficiency. In small samples (of 50 observations) DEA’s relative performance vis-à-vis stochastic 
methods even improves when more noise is introduced. A recent paper by Banker, Chang and Cooper 
(2004) claims that, even under the presence of heteroscedasticity, DEA-based estimators give the best 
results. 
 
To summarize, only in cases where the estimated SF function is close to the underlying technology it 
seems that DEA is occasionally outperformed by SF. Since we are dealing with a relatively small 
sample and little is known concerning a production function relating public expenditure to outputs for 
health, education and government effectiveness, there is a considerable risk of misspecification. 
Resorting to more flexible forms (such as the translog) is not an adequate solution in small samples 
(Gong and Sickles, 1992, Ruggiero, 1999, Resti, 2000). In addition, several authors have convincingly 
argued that SF fails to effectively decompose noise and inefficiency (Banker, Gadh and Gorr, 1993, 
Ruggiero, 1999, Ondrich and Ruggiero, 2001, Mortimer and Peacock, 2002), indicating SF’s ability to 
cope with measurement error and other random disturbances mainly exists on a conceptual and not on 
a practical level. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
8 This is a mathematical construct smaller than any positive number. In practice no real number is used for ε . θ  
is maximized first and then the sum of slacks is maximized keeping θ  to its maximum value obtained 
(Thanassoulis, 2001, p. 50). 
9 Gong and Sickles (1992) estimate inefficiency in a panel data context, where unconditional inefficiency can be 
estimated under the assumption that it does not change over time. In a cross-country setting, SF can only 
estimate conditional efficiency, which may influence results.   12
A few authors have undertaken efforts to estimate government inefficiency. Gupta and Verhoeven 
(2001) gauge inefficiency in health and education expenditure for a sample of developing countries, 
while Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2003) relate public spending to a broad set of output indicators 
for 25 industrialized countries. Both papers conclude there are wide disparities among countries in the 
way public expenditure is transformed into outputs, again highlighting the importance of inefficiency. 
Although our empirical approach to estimate inefficiency roughly resembles the methodology Afonso, 
Schuknecht and Tanzi (2003) and Gupta and Verhoeven (2001) adopt, some modifications are 
introduced. For instance, both papers apply Free Disposable Hull (FDH) to estimate inefficiency. FDH 
is a DEA model that only considers other existing DMUs and not fictitious DMUs, constructed under 
the convexity assumption, as reference units (see Post, 1999, p. 62-64). Because there is no reason to 
assume that any convex combination of two DMUs should not be attainable and because the BCC 
estimator has better finite sample properties than the FDH estimator (Post, 1999, p. 62-64), we apply a 
BCC model. In any case, the disparity between both methods should be small. Other differences 




In this paper we focus exclusively on developing countries. We have tried to find the relevant data for 
all 118 countries the World Bank classifies as low and lower middle income economies (with 2001 
GNI per capita lower than $2,975). Due to missing observations the sample was reduced to 52 
countries. All data in this section are from the World Development Indicators (2003), unless stated 
otherwise. 
 
One input is considered: central government expenditure per capita based on purchasing power parity 
(PPP). Outputs are grouped in three relevant domains: health, education and government 
effectiveness
10. Outputs for health are infant mortality and immunization against measles. The two 
education outputs are the youth illiteracy rate and secondary school enrolment. The third dimension 
consists of one output: ‘government effectiveness’, taken from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2003). This variable combines responses on the quality of public service provision, the quality of the 
bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of civil service from political 
pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies. Therefore, it measures how 
                                                       
10 Other outputs worth considering would be inequality and infrastructure. Unfortunately, consistently measured 
inequality data are not available for a lot of developing countries. Infrastructure is usually measured as a stock 
variable (amount of paved roads, railroad lines,…) from which it is hard to disentangle the current effect of 
government expenditure. First differencing is an option, but this would substantially increase measurement error. 
Also, first differencing would favor governments in countries that start from low levels of infrastructure.   13
well the government is equipped to implement good policies and deliver public goods. Table 1 gives 
an overview of the selected input and outputs. 
 
Table 1: Selected Input and Outputs for the Government Inefficiency Measures 
INPUT 




Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births), 1995-1999 average 
Immunization against measles (% of children under 12 months) , 1995-1999 average 
Education 
Youth illiteracy rate (% of people ages 15-24) , 1995-1999 average 
Secondary school enrolment (% gross) , 1995-1999 average 
Government effectiveness 
Government effectiveness, observation for 1996 
 
Note: all variables from World Development Indicators, 2003, except government effectiveness, which is taken 




To allow for a lagged effect of public spending, expenditure is averaged over the period 1990-1994, 
while outputs are evaluated in the second half of the 90s (see Table 1). Three different technical output 
inefficiency scores are estimated
11. INEFFIC5 relates public expenditure to all 5 outputs. Since child 
mortality and youth illiteracy are bads, a transformation is necessary to conform to the isotonicity 
property. This property states that “an increase in any input should result in some output increase and 
not a decrease in any output” (Bowlin, 1998, p. 17). One possibility would be to take complements, 
subtracting the observations for child mortality (youth illiteracy) from 1,000 (100). However, 
subtracting child mortality from 1,000 greatly reduces the relative distance between governments, 
giving the impression that every country does relatively well in this output. This brings every 
                                                       
11 We focus on output inefficiency – and not input inefficiency – because it is more relevant for governments in 
developing countries. Despite the sizeable debt burdens plaguing some of these countries, the relevant question 
to be answered is not how the same results can be achieved with less expenditure, but how better results can be 
obtained from the same amount of spending.   14
government closer to the production possibility frontier, leaving little room for a radial expansion of 
outputs. Therefore, we use the reciprocals of child mortality and youth illiteracy as outputs. This has 
the advantage of leaving relative positions of governments unchanged
12. A similar problem arises for 
government effectiveness, roughly situated between -2.5 and 2.5. Since an affine displacement does 
not alter the efficient frontier, Bowlin (1998) suggests adding the same positive amount to the values 
of the variable concerned for all DMUs in order to solve the non-positivity problem. However, in a 
BCC output orientated model an affine displacement of outputs does affect the inefficiency scores of 
those DMUs not on the efficient frontier (Lovell and Pastor, 1995). For that reason, we project the 
observations for government effectiveness on a [0,1]-interval, instead of adding an arbitrary number to 
them. For INEFFIC3, each dimension is represented by one output. These 3 outputs are constructed as 
the averages of the relevant original outputs for every dimension, after rescaling them to a [0,1]-
interval. INEFFIC1 has only one output indicator, calculated as the average of the 3 outputs used to 
estimate INEFFIC3. To save space we only report the results for INEFFIC1 in Table A1 in appendix, 
where we have ranked countries from most to least efficient. Correlations with INEFFIC3 and 
INEFFIC5 are 0.908 and 0.868, respectively. 
 
China, Malawi and Russia achieve an inefficiency score of 1, while Sri Lanka and Thailand come very 
close to the efficient frontier. Several authors have drawn attention to the accomplishments of China 
and Sri Lanka with regards to health and education (Perkins, Radelet, Snodgrass, Gillis and Roemer, 
2001, p. 354-355, Filmer, Hammer and Pritchett, 1997, p. 12-13, Musgrove, 1996, p. 44-45), so it is 
no surprise they do well here. Sub-Saharan African countries are almost entirely clustered around the 
higher inefficiency scores. One exception is Malawi. Malawi has the lowest PPP public expenditure 
per capita in the sample, so it is automatically placed on the efficient frontier (see figure 1). Restricting 
our attention to the output indicator we can see Malawi does not do well at all and is even situated in 
the worst quarter. This is a practical example of the fact that variable returns to scale models tend to 
overestimate efficiency in small samples, especially at sample extremes (Resti, 2000, Yu, 1998). In 
our sample this is only a minor problem, since the ‘next’ efficient country (in figure 1 this would be 
point B) is China with both very low public expenditure per capita and a high output indicator. The 
correlation of INEFFIC1 with an inefficiency measure estimated without Malawi exceeds 0.999. Only 
a few countries are affected and even for them changes in inefficiency scores are almost negligible. 
                                                       
12 Suppose country A and B have a child mortality of 50 and 10, respectively. Since child mortality is a bad, 
country A could do 5 times better. Taking reciprocals gives 0.02 for A and 0.1 for B as good output. Again, we 
find that A could do 5 times better, if only it was as efficient as B in reducing child mortality. Subtracting 
observations from 1,000 gives 950 for A and 990 for B, leaving almost no room for A to expand its output.   15
Correlations of INEFFIC1 with an inefficiency measure based on estimations for a broader set of 
countries
13, both with and without Malawi, exceed 0.99. 
 
As can be seen from Table 2 the mean inefficiency score, excluding the clear outliers Malawi and the 
Democratic Republic Congo (DRC), is 1.55. This means the composed output indicator could on 
average be expanded by more than 50%, keeping input fixed. This quite large – but definitely not 
implausible – figure simply follows from the fact that we have lumped outputs together. When more 
than one output is considered, DEA automatically attaches greater weight to any output for which a 
government does relatively well, thereby reducing (the variation between) inefficiency scores. Mean 
inefficiency in the same sample of 50 countries for INEFFIC3 and INEFFIC5 is 1.27 and 1.16, 
respectively. However, even for INEFFIC5 and INEFFIC3 government inefficiency among countries 
can vary substantially, as the descriptive statistics in Table 2 show. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Different Government Inefficiency Measures 































Note: INEFFIC1, INEFFIC3 and INEFFIC5 are government inefficiency measures, estimated with Onfront 2.0, 
for the full sample of 52 countries. See the text in this section for more information. Results for all countries for 
INEFFIC1 are given in Table A1 in appendix. To calculate the descriptive statistics Malawi and the DRC are 
excluded. 
 
Our measurement of government inefficiency might however be affected by an imperfect mapping of 
input to outputs. Although the input comprises total government expenditure, the outputs do not 
represent the full range of matters touched upon by government intervention. For instance, countries 
allocating a large chunk of their spending towards infrastructure investment could end up with a 
higher government inefficiency measure, because the good state of their infrastructure (that is, 
                                                       
13 Searching data for all countries included in the 2003 World Development Indicators expanded our data set to 
85 observations.   16
assuming their infrastructure spending is efficient) is not taken into account, and they have less 
resources left to divert towards the outputs we do consider in our inefficiency measure
14. 
 
A correction for this potential bias would be to compute government inefficiency using the 
expenditure categories directly allocated to the outputs considered. However, at present no 
disaggregated data are available that would allow us to do this for a sufficiently large number of 
countries. In any case, we expect the influence of expenditure allocation on the estimated inefficiency 
to be small. It is highly likely that government inefficiency in infrastructure is strongly correlated with 
the inefficiency in other spending components (health, education,…). One oft heard reason why public 
services fail poor people, is that these people do not even have the means to reach the site where 
services are provided (World Bank, 2003). Lack of decent infrastructure makes it difficult to provide a 
range of high quality public services to every citizen. Secondly, the provision of high quality 
infrastructure creates a benign market environment for investments in human capital, raising the 
demand for health and education. Furthermore, in computing inefficiency, DEA favors the output for 
which a country does relatively well. Thus, in the efficiency measures with more than one output, the 
countries that are identified as inefficient are basically the ones who do bad (relative to the other 
countries) on every output
15. Therefore, it is less likely that adding one or two outputs would seriously 
influence the estimated inefficiency. 
 
 
4  The Determinants of Inefficiency: a General to Specific Approach. 
 
In this section, INEFFIC1 is used as the dependent variable in a general to specific approach of 
regression analysis (Charemza and Deadman, 1992, Hoover and Perez, 2000). To our knowledge, 
there have not been any previous attempts to model government inefficiency empirically. The general 
to specific approach is adopted because a comprehensive theory for the explanation of inefficiency is 
absent. General to specific avoids the worst excesses of data mining, where researchers attempt several 
different combinations of candidate variables for a given data set, in search of ‘the best regression’. 
One of the main criticisms against general to specific is that sequential test procedures using 
conventional critical values understate the true size of the joint test implicit in the search procedure. 
This would allow too many irrelevant variables to survive the search procedure. Hoover and Perez 
                                                       
14 Similarly, no outputs associated with military spending are included. 
15 This only applies to the inefficiency measures with more than one output. The inefficiency measure with one 
output that we use as our dependent variable is, however, strongly correlated with these inefficiency measures 
(cf. supra).   17
(2000) have refuted this criticism by showing their particular application of the general to specific 
methodology maintains a size near the nominal size of the employed tests. They also find a power very 
close to the true power one should find if the specification were not in doubt, leading them to conclude 
general to specific outperforms the robustness analyses proposed by Levine and Renelt (1992) and 
Sala-i-Martin (1997a and 1997b). It is also well known that omission of relevant variables causes bias 
while including irrelevant variables only leads to less precise estimates. Thus, little can be said in 
favor of a simple-to-general approach (see Greene, 2003, p. 148-152). 
 
Table A2 lists all the regressors included in the general model. They are grouped under five headings: 
structural country and past policy variables, governance indicators, and political, external assistance 
and economic policy variables. Though the structural country variables are exogenous to the current 
government and are hardly or not under its control when taking policy initiatives, they could affect 
inefficiency or could have a direct impact on the outputs considered (see Gupta, Verhoeven and 
Tiongson, 1999). For example, a higher GDP per capita and a lower illiteracy rate indicate a country 
starts from a higher level of human skills and economic capital, from which we expect a positive effect 
on government efficiency. To some extent these variables also capture past policy and past 
inefficiency. A persistent neglect of education by past governments, for instance, would mean the 
current government has to deal with higher adult illiteracy. Also included is a measure of natural 
resources, as Gylfason (2001) argues abundant natural resources lead to the neglect of education (the 
primary sector has less stringent educational demands), rent seeking and economic policy failures. We 
further include military spending (as a % of central government spending), because our measurement 
of government inefficiency might be affected by an imperfect mapping of input to outputs (cf. supra). 
Ideally, we would also like to include the share of spending that is allocated towards infrastructure 
investment but, unfortunately, such data are not available for a sufficient number of countries. 
Including military spending allows us to check, at least to some extent, whether the automatic effects 
discussed above are important or not. 
 
The governance indicators, projected on a [0,1] interval to simplify the interpretation of results, and 
the political variables grasp the two routes of accountability in service provision, extensively described 
in the World Development Report 2004 (World Bank, 2003). The short route runs directly from 
citizens/clients to service providers, while the long route involves citizens influencing politicians who, 
in their turn, can influence service providers. Because of reduced political risk and increased 
accountability and transparency, we expect countries with higher governance scores (i.e. better rule of 
law and control of corruption, a more stable political regime and more press freedom), more political 
freedom, and less involvement in armed conflict, to be more efficient. 
   18
The external assistance variables are added to the general model to check whether IMF programs and 
development assistance have been able to strengthen government efficiency. IMF assistance is 
conditional to a structural adjustment program of deregulation and privatization in order to restore the 
market incentives in the economy, in which the state returns to its core tasks and is disciplined by 
market sanctioning. Another condition the IMF often imposes is fiscal austerity. Insisting governments 
cut their budget deficits should also prompt them to raise efficiency. In addition, development 
assistance, i.e. the transfer of capital goods (e.g. IT infrastructure), technology and human skills to less 
developed countries, may have a positive effect on government efficiency. 
 
Economic policy variables are included in the analysis to reflect the market orientation of a 
government. We expect that more international trade (a higher level of integration in the world 
economy) compels the government to more market discipline and hence increases government 
efficiency. A similar reasoning might apply to MONEYGROWTH, the variable we consider as a 
proxy for the tendency of the government to revert to monetary financing of budget deficits. A higher 
rate of MONEYGROWTH may imply less budgetary discipline and hence a reduced incentive 
towards expenditure efficiency. LIQLIAB is included because a better developed financial system 
could reduce the possibility to rig the financial system, thus putting more pressure on the government 
to control its budget by working in an efficient manner. On the other hand, better developed financial 
systems could make it easier to domestically finance deficits. The sign of FDI is a priori ambiguous. In 
general, as a proxy for integration in the world economy complementary to trade openness, we may 
expect that a higher inflow of foreign direct investments forces the government to behave in a more 
free market compatible way and to comply with the higher governance standards that multinational 
corporations expect. However, foreign direct investments in developing countries may also be linked 
to rent extraction and rent sharing between the political elite and the foreign corporations, leading to 
favoritism, corruption,… and, ultimately, more inefficiency (Todaro and Smith, 2003). 
 





j , i i j X INEFFIC Log ε β β + + = ∑
= 1
0 1 , (8) 
 
with natural logarithm of INEFFIC1 as the dependent variable,  i X  the determinant  ) n , ,... i ( i 1 =  of 
the potential n determinants of government inefficiency we identified and  j ε  the usual white noise 
error term. The model is estimated with OLS. In the specification process, we sequentially drop the 
variables with the highest p-value until all variables are significant on a 10% significance level. 
White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are used to correct for possible   19
heteroscedasticity. Our search for the determinants of inefficiency is conducted over different samples 
to examine the influence of outliers (see the note under Table 3). Because of the missing values for 
some of the variables included in the general model the search path from the general to the specific 
model may be disturbed by a sample selection bias. For instance, when CONTROLCORR is dropped, 
6 new observations enter the analysis. The additional information contained in these observations 
seriously affects coefficients and p-values of the remaining variables. When we keep the number of 
observations constant, the effect on the other variables and coefficient of determination is minimal, as 
one would expect. To avoid that results are influenced by fluctuations in the number of observations, 
four different general models are considered as starting points (again, see the note under Table 3), 
gradually excluding more of the variables with missing observations. None of these variables ever 
remain significant when we start from a general model where they are included
16. 
 
We report our results in Table 3. All the search paths lead to a very similar specific model, except for 
the model in column (5), where GDPCAP (with the wrong sign) and FHPOLRIGHTS enter the final 
specification
17. However, both variables are only significant on a 10%-level while most other variables 
are significant on a 1%-level. Compared to the models in columns (4) and (6) in Table 3, who have the 
same number of observations, the model in column (5) has a lower adjusted R² and higher information 
criteria. Therefore, we do not further consider this model. Instead, we focus on the models in columns 
(3) and (6), which have the highest adjusted R² and lowest information criteria of all the models 
considered with the same number of observations. Also, the models in columns (3) and (6) are arrived 
at from following a very stable search path. 
 
A considerable part of the variation in inefficiency can be explained by the variables included in the 
models in column (3) and column (6) in Table 3. With respect to the five groups of potential 
explanatory variables we distinguished, government inefficiency in the low and lower middle income 
countries in our sample is mainly determined by governance, political variables and country 
characteristics. Sub-Saharan African countries are, on average, about 25% less efficient. There are 
some indications that foreign direct investment is associated with higher inefficiency, contrary to the 
                                                       
16 For two of these variables there are additional reasons justifying their exclusion. CONTROLCORR could be 
endogenously determined. As regards IMF (in fact only lacking one observation), it has been argued that failure 
to account for non-observable factors influencing the likelihood of a government entering into an IMF agreement 
(especially political will), results in an inability to capture the inherent effect of an IMF agreement (Przeworski 
and Vreeland, 2000, Vreeland, 2003). If countries with an IMF agreement indeed have more ‘political will’, this 
would push towards a negative coefficient for IMF. The fact that we do not find this suggests IMF agreements 
do not seem to have strong efficiency improving effects. 
17 Recall from Table A2 that a higher value for FHPOLRIGHTS reflects less political freedom, so this variable 
has the expected sign.   20
general expectation. Countries with more adult illiteracy and a larger share of young people in total 
population produce less output for a given amount of public expenditure. A one standard deviation 
increase in these variables results in an increase in inefficiency scores of some 9%. One standard 
deviation increases in POLSTAB and LAW reduce inefficiency with 6% and 10-11%, respectively. 
The occurrence of these variables offers empirical support to the routes of accountability discussed in 
the 2004 World Development Report (World Bank, 2003). The effect of a standard deviation increase 
in POLCON on inefficiency is about 7%. The positive sign of POLCON indicates that – after 
controlling for political stability and rule of law – political constraints, limiting the ability of 
politicians to pursue their preferred course of action, hamper government efficiency.   21
 










































































































































































Note: This table reports the specific models starting from different samples and general models. **(*) denotes 
significance at 5(10)% level. White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are used to correct for 
possible heteroscedasticity. t-statistics are reported in brackets. Sample is indicated by the letter S: S1 stands for 
the full sample (excluding only Malawi and The DRC), S2 also excludes obvious outliers for 
MONEYGROWTH (Bolivia, Nicaragua and Peru), S3 excludes additional outliers (Swaziland for FDI, 
Nicaragua for ODACAP and South Africa for PRIVHEALTH). 
General model is indicated by GM: GM1 includes all variables, GM2 excludes CONTROLCORR, GM3 also 
excludes LIQLIAB and MONEYGROWTH, GM4 excludes IMF as well. Since S1GM3=S2GM3 and 
S1GM4=S2GM4 this strategy yields at most 10 different final specifications.   22
 
Since PRIVHEALTH only relates to one of the output dimensions, it is no surprise the impact of this 
variable is quite small
18. 
 
We controlled whether sample bias might explain the somewhat unexpected sign of the effect of FDI 
on government inefficiency. For several countries FDI is not available for the second half of the 80s, 
preventing us from fully exploiting the available data set. Therefore, as an additional test, we replace 
FDI with FDIFULL. To construct FDIFULL missing observations for FDI are replaced with the 
observation in the first available year after 1989 (1990 for Romania and Yemen, 1993 for Belarus and 
Mongolia, and 1994 for South Africa). Repeating the above analysis with FDIFULL yields very 
similar specific models as the ones reported in Table 3 (available on request) and does not change 
anything about the qualitative interpretation of the results. 
 
We conduct several sensitivity analyses in the sample excluding all outliers and starting from the 
general model without CONTROLCORR, LIQLIAB, MONEYGROWTH and IMF. First we check 
whether ethnic diversity has a more complex effect on government inefficiency (see Collier, 2001). It 
could well be the negative impact of ethnic diversity is very low for both very homogeneous and very 
heterogeneous societies. To test this, ETHNICDOM is constructed as a dummy for countries with a 
value for ETHNIC between 0.4 and 0.65. Yet, this variable is not withheld in the final specification. 
Adding ETHNIC² or ETHNIC*FHPOLRIGHTS next to ETHNIC in the general model, allowing for 
non-linearities and interaction effects in the relationship between ethnic diversity and inefficiency, 
does not change the final specification either. A second sensitivity analysis concerns the (insignificant) 
effect of development assistance on government inefficiency. ODACAPWDI is the net received 
official development assistance per capita (PPP), calculated as the product of aid as a % of GNI with 
PPP GNI, using aid data from the World Development Indicators (2003) instead of OECD’s Statistical 
Compendium. Often, development assistance is not used to buy local goods and services but is spent 
on international markets, with payments being made in US$. Therefore, we also check whether 
ODACAP$, the net received official development assistance per capita expressed in US$ (OECD, 
Statistical Compendium, edition 01#2003), significantly affects inefficiency
19. Again, neither variable 
is significantly related to inefficiency. 
 
                                                       
18 A one standard deviation increase reduces inefficiency with about 6%. Perhaps private health expenditures are 
also a proxy for private education expenditures, for which we have no data. This would explain why 
PRIVHEALTH influences inefficiency even though it only relates to one of the three output dimensions.  
19 Nicaragua is removed as an outlier for ODACAPWDI, but not for ODACAP$. For the latter variable, 
Nicaragua’s value is more in line with those of the other countries.   23
Development assistance may, however, be endogenous to government inefficiency (see Bräutigam and 
Knack, 2004). Many donors allocate resources towards countries with improving institutional quality. 
On the other hand, donors are often called upon to relieve distress in those countries worst off. To 
address the endogeneity issue 2SLS regressions are run, with very similar instruments as the ones 
proposed by Burnside and Dollar (2000). Next to the governance indicators POLSTAB, VOICE and 
LAW, GDP per capita in PPP-terms
20, the population in 1990, the share of arms imports in total 
import (1990-1994 average) and the average annual growth of the CPI over the period 1985-1989
21 are 
included as instruments (all taken from the World Development Indicators, 2003). To capture 
strategical considerations, dummy’s for Egypt (an important ally of the US), Sub-Saharan Africa (who 
get a large share of European aid), the Franc zone (receiving a lot of aid from France) and Central-
America (in the sphere of influence of the US) are added. This model does very well in explaining 
variations in aid, especially for ODACAP (R²=0.725) and ODACAPWDI (R²=0.78), with most 
variables being significant on at least a 10% level and having the expected sign. The exogenous 
components
22 of the three aid variables do not show a significant relationship with inefficiency. In 
fact, all of the reported sensitivity analyses in the last two paragraphs lead to model (6) in Table 3, 
lending additional support to the robustness of this model specification. Hence, development 
assistance does not seem to contribute to better outputs for a given amount of resources, either by 
directly affecting outputs or by influencing government inefficiency. This result is broadly in line with 
– but also supplements – Bräutigam and Knack (2004), who find higher levels of aid intensity in 
African countries are associated with larger declines in the quality of governance and in tax revenues 
as a share of GDP, with some indication that the effect of aid on governance in the recipient countries 
is slightly less damaging in the 90s. 
 
A caveat of the models in column (3) and column (6) in Table 3, is their weak performance on the 
Ramsey reset test of misspecification, while a Jarque-Bera test rejects the null hypothesis of normally 
distributed residuals in model (3)
23. This may be most straightforwardly explained by the linearity of 
the relationship we imposed in the estimation model. When countries are ranked from most to least 
efficient, inefficiency scores rise faster towards the end of the sample (even after taking logarithms), 
reflecting wider disparity in inefficiency among the least efficient countries. Consequently, residuals 
                                                       
20 Averaged over 1985-1989 except for Belarus, Romania and Yemen, where the observation for 1990 is used. 
21 Except for Belarus, Mongolia, Romania, Russia and Yemen where the 1990-1994 average is used. 
22 Regressions for the aid variables are run for all countries. The predicted values for Nicaragua for ODACAP 
and ODACAPWDI, but not for ODACAP$, are subsequently excluded. 
23 This test adds the estimated values of the dependent variable in some form to the regression and uses a F-test 
to check significance. In our case, three different tests are performed, adding 
2 ˆ Y ; 
2 ˆ Y  and 
3 ˆ Y ; and 
2 ˆ Y ,
3 ˆ Y  and 
4 ˆ Y  to the regression.   24
for these countries are strongly positive, revealing that a linear model has some difficulties to explain 
these higher inefficiency scores. Indeed, when we run the same regression as the one in column (6) of 
Table 3, excluding the last 5 observations (leaving us with 39 observations), the fit of the model 
increases sharply, normality of the residuals can no longer be rejected, and the Ramsey reset test no 
longer indicates misspecification. 
 
However, simply dropping the least efficient governments from the sample is not an adequate 
response to the bad performance on the reset test. To improve the model in column (6) in Table 3 we 
add the quadratic terms of all the variables and the interaction terms of all the variables and DSAFR. 
A general to specific strategy, sequentially eliminating the most insignificant quadratic terms and 
interaction effects, leads to the model in Table 4. Normality of the residuals can no longer be rejected, 
and the Ramsey reset test no longer points towards misspecification. 
 



























































Note:  Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of INEFFIC1. OLS estimates, White’s 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are used to correct for possible heteroscedasticity. **(*) 
denotes significance at 5(10)%, t-values are reported in brackets.   25
The significance of most of the interaction terms and the large increase in the (adjusted) R² suggest we 
may have underestimated the heterogeneity in the sample. In particular, capturing the specificity of the 
Sub-Saharan African countries by a dummy variable is apparently too simplistic. The Sub-Saharan 
African countries show substantial slope heterogeneity. Nevertheless, most of the previously identified 
relationships still hold, but they appear to be stronger for Sub-Saharan African countries, at least for 
POPYOUNG, POLSTAB and PRIVHEALTH. FDI now only reduces efficiency for Sub-Saharan 
African countries. This could be due to rent extraction and rent shifting, given the important share of 
primary sector investments in total FDI in these countries. Adult illiteracy is generally associated with 
more inefficiency, but not for Sub-Saharan African countries: an F test does not reject the null 
hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of ILLITERACY and DSAFR*ILLITERACY is zero. 
Political constraints particularly seem to affect efficiency when they reach very high levels.  
 
A final problem is the potential endogeneity of POLCON. Laffont (2001, p. 34) reports a possible 
“move towards more bureaucratic rules as a constitutional response to capture”. Similarly, an 
inefficient government could be punished in subsequent elections by the electorate. Even if the 
election is won, the ruling party’s majority could be slashed, limiting their room to maneuver. In both 
cases, more political constraints follow from high inefficiency. Yet, the opposite may also apply, in 
particular in developing countries. If anything, inefficient (and corrupt) governments try to expand 
their clout, for instance by passing laws which make it more difficult or even dangerous to oppose the 
government. Voters in developing countries may also resign themselves in their loss: inefficiency is 
often seen as an inherent element of governing, embezzled public funds as part of politicians’ fringe 
benefits. As a result, we would expect that political constraints are fairly exogenous, and only scarcely 





The main aim of this paper was to identify the factors determining government inefficiency. As 
discussed, most authors initially did not find a robust relationship between productive spending 
categories and growth. Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) have explained these counterintuitive 
results by a failure to account for distortionary taxes. We have argued a complementary explanation is 
failure to account for inefficiency. This claim was supported by a simple endogenous growth model 
that explicitly considers the role of inefficiency. Especially for developing countries it is very likely 
that inefficiency plays an even more important role than distortionary taxation, due to the income 
structure in these countries and the systematical occurrence of substantial inefficiencies. 
   26
Government inefficiency measures, relating public expenditure to outputs for health, education and 
government effectiveness, were estimated with DEA, a non-parametric linear programming-based 
technique designed to measure relative efficiency. These estimates reveal wide disparities in the way 
governments transform spending into relevant outputs. Sub-Saharan African countries perform very 
badly, while China, Russia, Sri Lanka and Thailand are among the most efficient countries. 
 
Subsequently, a general to specific approach of regression analysis was adopted to search for the 
determinants of inefficiency. We find that government inefficiency is determined primarily by 
governance and political variables, like rule of law and political stability. In addition, structural 
country variables (in part reflecting past policies and past inefficiency) such as a large share of young 
people in total population, high adult illiteracy and low private health spending make it more difficult 
for governments to produce outputs for a given amount of public spending. Governments should 
therefore focus on strengthening rule of law and maintaining political stability to reduce inefficiency. 
When controlling for these variables, political constraints, limiting the ability of politicians to pursue 
their preferred course of action, hamper government efficiency. A final, perhaps unsurprising result, is 
that Sub-Saharan African countries are far less efficient than the other developing countries. A model 
variant that tries to take better account of the non-linearities in the data, reveals larger effects of the 
share of young people, private health spending and political stability for Sub-Saharan African 
countries. Political constraints seem particularly harmful when they reach very high levels. 
 
Economic policy variables, representing the market orientation of a country, do not seem to be 
important for government inefficiency. Foreign direct investments are even associated with more, and 
not less, inefficiency. This effect is, however, mostly driven by the Sub-Saharan African countries in 
our sample, where investments are predominantly directed towards the primary sector, leading to rent 
shifting, rent extracting and – in the end – higher inefficiency. No relationship between ethnic 
diversity and inefficiency was uncovered, even when we allow for more complex connections between 
both variables. A final noteworthy result is that development assistance has not been able to lead to 
higher outputs for a given amount of resources. This may call for a revision in the way aid is 




Table A1: Government Inefficiency Scores. 
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Table A2: Explanatory Variables in the General to Specific Approach 
Variable Definition  and  Source 
 
Structural country and past policy  variables (World Development Indicators, 2003) 
 
DEFENSE  Military expenditure (% of central government expenditure), 1990-1994 
average 
DLAM  Dummy for Latin-American countries. 
DSAFR  Dummy for Sub-Saharan African countries. 
GDPCAP  GDP per capita, PPP (current international $), 1985-1989 average, except for 
Belarus, Romania and Yemen (observation for 1990) 
ILLITERACY  Illiteracy rate, adult total (% of population ages 15 and above), 1990-1994 
average 
NATRES  Employment in agriculture (% of total employment), 1990-1994 average 
POPYOUNG  Population ages 0-14 (% of total), 1990-1999 average. 
PRIVHEALTH  Private health expenditure per capita, PPP, obtained by multiplying PPP GDP 
per capita with private health expenditure as a % of GDP. 1990-1999 average. 
URBAN  Urban population (% of total), 1990-1999 average. 
 
Governance indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2003) for 1996, higher values indicate better 
performance. 
 
CONTROLCORR  Control of corruption measures perceptions of (the eradication of) corruption, 
defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. 
LAW  Rule of law. Comprises several indicators that measure the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include 
perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of 
the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. 
POLSTAB  Political stability and the absence of violence combines several indicators that 
measure perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be 
destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means. 
VOICE  Voice and accountability measures the extent to which citizens of a country are 
able to participate in the selection of governments. Also included are indicators 
measuring press independence. 
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ETHNIC  Ethnic fractionalization, based on a combination of linguistic and racial 
characteristics. For most countries this measure is available for the beginning 
of the 1990s. 
Source: Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat and Wacziarg, 2002. 
FHPOLRIGHTS  Freedom House (2004) political rights, 1990-1994 average. Higher values 
signify less political freedom. 
FHCIVILLIB  Freedom House (2004) civil liberties, 1990-1994 average. Higher values 
signify less political freedom. 
POLCON  Political constraints. Estimates the feasibility of policy change (i.e. the extent 
to which a change in the preferences of any one actor may lead to a change in 
government policy), thus reflecting the extent to which a given political actor is 
constrained in his or her choice of future policies. 1990-1994 average. 
Source: POLCONV variable, taken from Henisz (2000) 
WAR  Dummy for countries involved in a armed conflict, with more than 1000 battle-
related deaths per year, that continued till after 1989 or commenced before 
1995. 




ODACAP  Net received official development assistance per capita, PPP. 1990-1994 
average, for Belarus the 1995 bilateral exchange rate is used. 
Source: own calculations, based on World Development Indicators, 2003 
(population, PPP and bilateral exchange rate with the US) and OECD, 
Statistical Compendium, edition 01#2003, Development and Aid, 
Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients – Flows, Total 
official development assistance net. 
IMF  Dummy for countries under a IMF agreement between 1985 and 1990. 
Source: Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000; Namibia and Vietnam are both added 
with a value of 0. Namibia only gained independence in 1990 and, according to 
Bird (2001), was never under an IMF agreement in the period 1980-1996. 
Vietnam was excluded from IMF loans until 1993, due to payment arrears.   30
 
Variable Definition  and  Source 
 
Economic policy variables (World Development Indicators, 2003, except LIQLIAB) 
 
MONEYGROWTH  Money and quasi money growth (annual %), 1985-1989 average  
LIQLIAB  Liquid liabilities (% of GDP), 1985-1989 average 
Source: Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2001 
EXPORT  Export of goods and services (% of GDP), 1985-1989 average, except for 
Belarus, Romania and Yemen (observation for 1990) 
FDI  Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) , 1985-1989 average 
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